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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. PAUL THOMPSON,

\

Plaintiff-Respondent, )
v.

THE CITY OF CENTERVILLE,
a Municipal Corporation,

j1

c~~~~ o.

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The pleadings before the lower court raised four
points upon which the plaintiff claimed the Utah Municipal Bond Act of 1965 (the pertinent parts of which are
set forth fully in appellant's brief and which will not be
duplicated here) was unconstitutional. The lower court
held that only that provision which enlarged the definition of "taxpayer" to include the "spouse" was uncon-
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stitutional. The lower court held that the provisions of
section 7 of the act complied with the constitution in implementing procedure which would insure the voting of
"taxpayers" only. He also held that the legislature in
including purchasers under contract as "taxpayers"
were within their constitutional right. He also held that
it was within the legislative power to provide that an
elector can vote if he has paid a property tax "during the
twelve months preceding the election" where the constitution provides "in the year preceding the election."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent asks this count to reverse the holding of the lower court in the matters of the procedure for
holding the election, the inclusion of contract purchasers
of property as taxpayers and the period when taxes are
paid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We agree with the statement of facts as recited by
the appellant but at all times have objected to the affidavit of J. Lambert Gibson as being immaterial.
ARGUMENT
(I) GENERAL HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION UNDER CON·
SIDERATION.
2

'Ve believe it would be well at the outset to give the
background of the constitutional provision here under
consideration and its history since its adoption.
We are here concerned with Article XIV, Section
3, of the Constitution of Utah which reads as follows:
"No debt in excess of the taxes for the current
year shall be created by any county or subdivision thereof, or by a school district therein, or
by any city, town or village, or any subdivision
thereof in this State unless the proposition to
create such debt shall have been submitted to a
vote of such qualified electors as shall have paid
a property tax therein, in the year preceding
such election, and a majority of that voting
thereon shall have voted in favor of incurring
such debt."
The above provision has remained unchanged since
the adoption of the Constitution. In all the time it has
been in force no case has been decided interpreting its
provisions or contesting a bond election because of irregularities in the voting or because of the voting of unqualified electors, except the very recent case of Eldred
R. Hamilton, et al., v. Salt Lake County Sewerage Improvement District No. 1, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390 P.2d 235,
decided by our Court on .March 16, 1964. The decision in
this case went off on factual grounds and the questions
of law to be decided in this action were reserved and left
unanswered by the Court. The decision of the Court in
the Hamilton case is of no assistance in the case at bar.
An examination of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention which ended on May 8, 1895, and
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which recommended the adoption of the constitution
gives little light on the intentions of the framers as to
the construction of the secion in question. It would appear that the discussions as to its meaning took place in
committee and not on the convention floor. The only discussion is found at Pages 1141and1142 of the proceedings and is as follows:
MR. THURMAN._ It m~ans the voters who
may be qualified by the Legislature. If I remember, our article on elections and suffrage or
the bill of rights, it provides that a property
qualification shall not be required except in cases
of a special tax or an indebtedness. It leaves the
Legislature, if they see fit, to fix a property qualifiication in those cases. Now, in view of the fact
that the Legislature may or may not provide for
a property qualification, this will fit the case.
MR. HART. 'Vhy not use the same language
that is used in section 4, requiring them to be
taxpayers?
MR. THURMAN. Well, it is a question
whether you want in the Constitution to do that.
If you do, all right. It has been left with the
Legislature to provide a property qualification
and I made this fit that condition. Section 8 of
the elections and suffrage article is as follows:
(Reads) . Now if that be construed to fix a
qualification absolutely without leaving it to the
Legislature in those cases, then this amendment
of mine meets that condition. If it be construed
that that leaves it to the Legislature and t~e
Legislature may afterwards provide any qual~
fication, then my amendment meets that condition.
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_MR. CANNON. I \Vould second the motion
of Mr. Thurman.
MR. SQUIRES. I would like to ask the
gentleman from Utah if he has any objections
to the transposition of that sentence as made by
the gentleman from Cache?
_MR. THURl\IAN. I have none whatever.
I think that is a proper transposition. I thought
it at the time. I accept that part of it.
MR. SQUIRES. Mr. Chairman, I understand a part of l\Ir. Kerr's Motion was that the
words, "at a general election," shall come after
the words, "have been submitted."
l\iIR. KERR. Yes, sir.
to.

The amendment of Mr. Thurman was agreed

l\1R. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I wish
to off er an amendment to section 3, line 13, after
the words, "received a" to "insert the words,
"two-thirds majority." I would like to say that
sometimes a bare majority imposes a very heavy
burden on a large minority, and I think where
such a large tax can be assessed that it would
be proper that we have a two-thirds majority.
The question being taken on the amendment,
the committee divided and by a vote of 29 ayes
to 42 noes, the amendment was rejected.
It would appear that the only concern of the Convention was whether or not the qualification of the electors should be limited by a constitutional provision or
should be left to the discretion of the legislature. The
limitation was imposed by the constitution. \Ve will dis-
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cuss the significance of this restriction later on in this
brief.
The only time the Legislature has enacted a law
relative to the conduct of a bond election was enacted in
the Laws of 1905, Chapter 107 which has to do with the
voting for bonds for school purposes. This legislation
uses the exact language used in Article XIV, Sec. 3, of
the constitution in defining the qualification of voters in
a school bond election.
The 1965 Legislature for the first time attempted
to implement and qualify the constitutional provision in
enacting the Utah Municipal Bond Act.
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION

7 OF THE ACT INSURE AND PROVIDE

SAFEGUARDS THAT ONLY ELECTORS
QUALIFIED TO VOTE PURSUANT TO
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3, WILL VOTE?
The Supreme Court in the Hamilton case, supra,
reserved the question as to whether or not an unsworn
statement of an elector that he had paid a tax in the
year preceding the election was sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional provision. There is nothing in the opinion
which answers or reserves the question as to a sworn
statement regarding his status as a taxpayer.
The provisions of Section 7 do not require that an
elector before voting, sign an affidavit as to his taxpaying status, the only time he is required to sign the affi-
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davit it when he has been challenged, there is no requirement for a mandatory challenge.
There is also a provision that the registration lists
used ma;IJ be checked against the tax rolls to determine
taxpayers' status, it will be observed that this requirement is not mandatory.
This leaves no safeguard that the person voting has
paid a property tax within the previous year and renders
the constitutional provision meaningless. Even if the
registration lists are checked against the tax rolls and a
person does not appear as having paid a tax, he can
nevertheless vote without signing the affidavit unless he
is challenged. "\\Te submit that to allow bond elections to
be held with no provisions to enforce compliance to the
constitutional mandate is to invite wholesale fraud.
l_\;fost of the cases we have found where the payment
of taxes is a requirement for voting are concerned with
the payment of poll taxes. The statutes implementing
the constitutional requirement of the payment of taxes
almost uniformly provide that the voter must produce a
tax receipt or if he has lost it, then sign an affidavit that
he has lost it. In every case there is legislation implementing the constitutional provisions relating to taxpayer qualification.
There is a compilation of the cases in 139 A.L.R.
562.

The case of Henry v. Oklahoma City, 108 P.2 148,
emphasized by appellant in his brief, we do not think is
7

in point. \Ve are not attacking the use of affidavits relative to taxpayer status where such affidavits are mandatory as they were under the Oklahoma Statute, we are
attacking a provision which makes no mandatory proof
as to taxpayer status on the elector, but leaves it up to
the election judges to challenge or not to challenge as
they see fit.
The same objection as made in the Henry case,
supra, can be applied to the case of Morgan v. Board of
Supervisors, 192 P .2d 236 (Ariz. 1948). In both cases
the legislature to insure that only those entitled to vote
made it an affirmative condition upon the voter to sign
an affidavit that he was a taxpayer. To insure the proper
conduct of an election under our Constitutional provision the legislature should make the same or a similar
requirement as that made in Arizona and Oklahoma.
We submit the two cases cited above are authority for
the position taken by respondent.
(3) IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE
LEGISLATURE TO EXTEND THE DEFINITION OF A TAXPAYER TO INCLUDE
THE SPOUSE OF A QUALIFIED ELECTOR
AS SHALL HAVE PAID A PROPERTY
TAX THEREIN, OR ONE PURCHASING
PROPERTY UNDER CONTRACT?

It is the contention for the plaintiff herein that the
legislature has no power to extend by statute the class
of persons entitled to vote under the constitutional
mandate. The constitution uses the phrase "*** Such
8

qualified electors as shall have paid a property tax therein, in the year preceding such election." It would seem
that the test as to who paid the tax would be the person
to whom it is assessed. The statute itself seems to contemplate this test as it provides that the tax rolls may be
checked against the registration lists.
In the case of State ex rel. Stain v. Christensen,
84 Utah 185, 35 P.2d 775, this Court said relative to the
power of the legislature to enlarge or restrict a constitutional provision:
"There is eminent authority and good reason
to support the doctrine that when a Constitution
prescribes eligibility for an office its declarations
are conclusive of the wijple matter whether the
language used is affirmative or negative in
form."
and in a special concurring opinion it was said:
"I think we all agree that where the Consti·
tution prescribes and eligibility and qualifications to hold an office created by the Constitution ,the Legislature may not enlarge or diminish
such provisions."
In discussing the meaning to be given the words
"property taxpayer" and related phrases, the Supreme
Court of Arizona in the case of Morgan v. Board of
Supervisors, et al., 192 P.2d 236 at page 242, discusses
the meanings in that case and in cases in other jurisdictions as follows :
Appellant relies upon such cases from other
jurisdictions as Lersch vs. Board of Public In-
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struction, 121 Fla. 621, 164 So. 281, where the
constitutional qualification of electors was "a
freeholder", or in Re Opinion to the Governor,
49 R.I. 296, 142 A. 372, 373, where "ownership
of real estate" was essential qualification. Such
cases are clearly distinguishable from the case
at bar where the test applied is "real property
taxpayers."

';\! e believe the following quotation from the
Louisiana Supreme Court construing the term
"property taxpayer" is more nearly applicable
to our problem.
"But the majority of the court think otherwise, being of the opinion that by the term 'prop·
erty taxpayer,' the Constitution means a person
who is S'uch at the moment he or she offers to
vote, and is such not ostensibly merely or, in
other words, according to the assessment roll,
but in reality; that in the intendment of the
Constitution those only shall vote who are to pay
the tax, who would be voting the tax upon themselves, and not upon others; those only who are
really owners of the property at the time it is
vited." (Emphasis supplied.) Law v. Village
of Marthaville, La. App., 195 So. 83.85.
A taxpayer is defined by Webster's New In·
ternational Dictionary, 2d Ed. Unabridged, as
"one who pays a tax." BQa,ck's Law Dictionary,
3d Ed., gives this definition: "Taxpayer. - A
person chargeable with a tax; one from whom
government demands a pecuniary contribution
towards its support." The Supreme Court of
Montana in the case of State v. Moulton, 57
Mont. 414, 189 P. 59, 61, said:
" 'A taxpayer' is one who owns property with·
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in the municipality and who pays a tax, or is
subject to and liable for a tax."
The following definition "A taxpayer is a
person owning property in the State, subject
to taxation, and on which he regularly pays
taxes" is cited with approval in many jurisdictions. See City of Pocatello v. Murray, 23 Idaho
447, 130 P. 383, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 1050; Castilo v. State Highway Commission, 312 Mo. 244,
279 S.W. 673; Lasityr v. City of Olympia, 61
Wash. 651, 112 P. 752. Certainly one who is
wholly exempt from taxation and actually pays
no taxes, as in the instant case, cannot fairly be
said to be a "taxpayer" and so qualify under our
constitutional provision.
In the case of Hicks v. Krigbaum, 13 Ariz.
237, 108 P.482, 485, we construed the phrase
"taxpayers of the district" as follows:

"*** We are of the opinion, *** that both the
legislative intent and a reasonable construction
requires us to read the phrase to mean those who
pay taxes upon property within the school district." (Emphasis supplied.)
As to whether or not a spouse qualifies as a taxpayer where the voter must qualify as one the case of
Tate v. Earlanger School District No. 32, Kentucky,
49 S.W. 337, says:
"Taxpayers as used in Ky. State, Sec. 4464,
requiring that petition to take the sense of voters
upon a proposition to vote a tax for a graded
school must be signed by at least 10 legal voters
who are taxpayers, means persons who pay taxes
in their own name on property in their own name,
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and does not include persons whose wives pay
taxes."
As to the inclusion of persons who are purchasing
property under contract we find the case of Fugate v.
.Mayor and City of the Town of Buffalo, 348 P.2d 76
('Vyoming). In this case, the statute provided that only
"property owners" were qualified to vote in a special
class. The court held that persons purchasing property
qualified as property owners but pointed out it was
because they had an interest in real property, there was
no taxpayer qualification required under the Statute.
Under the familiar rules of constitutional and legislative construction the words to be construed must be
given their usual meaning and a constitutional restriction cannot be broadened by legislative act. We submit
that had the framers of the constitution intended to extend the vote in bond elections to persons owning an
interest in property they would have said just that.
There is no indication that they anticipated an extension
of the class and they certainly did not want to give the
power to the legislature or they would not have included
the restriction in the constitution. It is significant that
since the adoption of the constitution in 1895 no legislature has attempted to extend the class who vote in
bond elections.
At the time the constitution was adopted the relationship of husband and wife was the same as it is now
and the statutory interest of the wife in the husbands
property, and the husbands rights of homestead were the
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same as they are now. The relationship of buyer and
seller is the same now as it was at that time. The constitution has limited the eligible voters in bond elections
and to now extend such class by legislation is unconstitutional and the remedy is to amend the constitution in
the orderly manner and not by legislative fiat.
( 4) IS IT CONSTITUTION AL FOR THE

LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE THAT AN
ELECTOR CAN VOTE IF HE HAS PAID
A
PROPERTY
TAX
"DURING
THE
Tl\TELVE MONTHS PRECEDING THE
ELECTION," WHEN THE CONSTITUTION
PROVIDES "IN THE YEAR PRECEDING
THE ELECTION?"
For some reason which is not apparent the legislature in Section 6 of the Utah Municipal Bond Act,
in defining an elector qualified him as "one who has paid
a property tax during the twelve months preceding the
election." The constitutional provisions provide for "in
the year preceding the bond election," which is the language used in setting forth the language to be used in
the affidavit provided for in Section 7.
The cases hold that where the word "year" is used
it ordinarily means the calendar year. There is no clue as
to the period intended to be covered by the members of
the Constitutional Convention, but it is reasonable to
assume that they used this word in its usual context, that
is, to require that a tax had been paid within the calendar year.
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The case of Sims v. The City of Bremerton, 66 P.2d
864 ( vV ashington) , discusses the meaning and cites cases
which hold that the usual use of the word "year" means
''calendar year.''
"The sole question to be determined is whether
the election was 'held in the year in which the
levy is made.' The levy must be made on the first
:Monday in October, 1937, or within 5 days thereafter." Rem. Rev. Stat. § 9000-4.
The decision turns upon the construction to be
given the word "year," as used in the initiative
measure. If it refers to the calendar year, then the
excess levy is not authorized. If it means a year
of 365 days, or 12 months, immediately preceding
the making of the levy, then the excess millage
is duly authorized. The trial court took the latter
view, and entered judgment accordingly.
Ordinarily, the term "year,'' when used in a
statute, is presumed to refer to the calendar year.
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Wellbrock,
143 S.C. 51, 141 S.E. 103. But if the context in
which it is used indicates that the legislative intent was otherwise, the term may be construed to
mean "fiscal year,'' a period of 365 days, or 12
months. United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. (40
U.S.) 141, 162, 10 L.Ed. 689; Hops v. Poe, :.?5
Cal. App. 451, 143 P. 1072; Glasgow v. Rowse,
43 Mo. 479; In re Providence Voters, 13 R.I.
737; Paetz v. State, 129 Wis. 174, 107 N.·w.
1090, 9 Ann. Cas. 767; People ex rel. Francis v.
Escheman, 63 Colo. 227, 165 P. 260; United
States v. l\ilabel Elevator Co., (D.C.) 17 F.2d
109; Ex parte Hewlett, 22 Nev. 333, 40 P. 96;
Bradley v. J;.Jsmeralda County, 32 Nev. 159, 104
P. 1958, Aun. Cas. 1912C, 680.
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The Court will observe that the Washington Court
did not adopt the usual use because they held that to do
so would create inequities. To hold that the use of the
words "preceding year" in our constitution means
''calendar year" would create no inequities and so the
usual usage should be given as we presume the framers
of the constitution intended.
The following cases also discuss the terms: People
vs. Palmer, 165 P 260, (Colorado) ; King vs. Board
of Canvassers, 105 Atl 372 (Rhode Island) .

CONCLUSION
The only conclusion we think the Court can reach
is that the Constitutional Convention and the people by
adopting the constitution wished only those persons who
paid the obligations incurred in bond elections should
have the right to vote in the elections and that safeguards
should be and would be erected to protect them. We submit that the provisions of Section 7 do not provide such
protection.
The extension of the provision that only persons
who paid a property tax should vote cannot be extended
to include persons who did not pay a tax by the legislature in view of the restriction contained in the constitution and any attempt by the legislature to do so renders
the law unconstitutional.
The changing of the wording by the legislature of
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that used in the constitution to render a different meauing to the word "year" is unconstitutional.
The decision of the lower court should be affirmed
as to the extension of the eligible taxpayers being unconstitutional and reversed as to all other matters.
Respectfully submitted,

NED 'V ARNOCK

of the firm
Critchlow, Watson & Warnock
414 'Valker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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